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""" passlib.handlers.cisco -- Cisco password hashes """ #============================================================================= # imports #============================================================================= # core from binascii import hexlify, unhexlify from hashlib import md5 import logging; log = logging.getLogger(__name__) from warnings import warn # site # pkg from passlib.utils import right_pad_string, to_unicode, repeat_string, to_bytes from passlib.utils.binary import h64 from passlib.utils.compat import unicode, u, join_byte_values, \ join_byte_elems, iter_byte_values, uascii_to_str import passlib.utils.handlers as uh # local __all__ = [ "cisco_pix", "cisco_asa", "cisco_type7", ] #============================================================================= # utils #============================================================================= #: dummy bytes used by spoil_digest var in cisco_pix._calc_checksum() _DUMMY_BYTES = b'\xFF' * 32 #============================================================================= # cisco pix firewall hash #============================================================================= class cisco_pix(uh.HasUserContext, uh.StaticHandler): """ This class implements the password hash used by older Cisco PIX firewalls, and follows the :ref:`password-hash-api`. It does a single round of hashing, and relies on the username as the salt. This class only allows passwords <= 16 bytes, anything larger will result in a :exc:`~passlib.exc.PasswordSizeError` if passed to :meth:`~cisco_pix.hash`, and be silently rejected if passed to :meth:`~cisco_pix.verify`. The :meth:`~passlib.ifc.PasswordHash.hash`, :meth:`~passlib.ifc.PasswordHash.genhash`, and :meth:`~passlib.ifc.PasswordHash.verify` methods all support the following extra keyword: :param str user: String containing name of user account this password is associated with. This is *required* in order to correctly hash passwords associated with a user account on the Cisco device, as it is used to salt the hash. Conversely, this *must* be omitted or set to ``""`` in order to correctly hash passwords which don't have an associated user account (such as the "enable" password). .. versionadded:: 1.6 .. versionchanged:: 1.7.1 Passwords > 16 bytes are now rejected / throw error instead of being silently truncated, to match Cisco behavior. A number of :ref:`bugs <passlib-asa96-bug>` were fixed which caused prior releases to generate unverifiable hashes in certain cases. """ #=================================================================== # class attrs #=================================================================== #-------------------- # PasswordHash #-------------------- name = "cisco_pix" truncate_size = 16 # NOTE: these are the default policy for PasswordHash, # but want to set them explicitly for now. truncate_error = True truncate_verify_reject = True #-------------------- # GenericHandler #-------------------- checksum_size = 16 checksum_chars = uh.HASH64_CHARS #-------------------- # custom #-------------------- #: control flag signalling "cisco_asa" mode, set by cisco_asa class _is_asa = False #=================================================================== # methods #=================================================================== def _calc_checksum(self, secret): """ This function implements the "encrypted" hash format used by Cisco PIX & ASA. It's behavior has been confirmed for ASA 9.6, but is presumed correct for PIX & other ASA releases, as it fits with known test vectors, and existing literature. While nearly the same, the PIX & ASA hashes have slight differences, so this function performs differently based on the _is_asa class flag. Noteable changes from PIX to ASA include password size limit increased from 16 -> 32, and other internal changes. """ # select PIX vs or ASA mode asa = self._is_asa # # encode secret # # per ASA 8.4 documentation, # http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/asa84/configuration/guide/asa_84_cli_config/ref_cli.html#Supported_Character_Sets, # it supposedly uses UTF-8 -- though some double-encoding issues have # been observed when trying to actually *set* a non-ascii password # via ASDM, and access via SSH seems to strip 8-bit chars. # if isinstance(secret, unicode): secret = secret.encode("utf-8") # # check if password too large # # Per ASA 9.6 changes listed in # http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/td/docs/security/asa/roadmap/asa_new_features.html, # prior releases had a maximum limit of 32 characters. # Testing with an ASA 9.6 system bears this out -- # setting 32-char password for a user account, # and logins will fail if any chars are appended. # (ASA 9.6 added new PBKDF2-based hash algorithm, # which supports larger passwords). # # Per PIX documentation # http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/security/pix/pix50/configuration/guide/commands.html, # it would not allow passwords > 16 chars. # # Thus, we unconditionally throw a password size error here, # as nothing valid can come from a larger password. # NOTE: assuming PIX has same behavior, but at 16 char limit. # spoil_digest = None if len(secret) > self.truncate_size: if self.use_defaults: # called from hash() msg = "Password too long (%s allows at most %d bytes)" % \ (self.name, self.truncate_size) raise uh.exc.PasswordSizeError(self.truncate_size, msg=msg) else: # called from verify() -- # We don't want to throw error, or return early, # as that would let attacker know too much. Instead, we set a # flag to add some dummy data into the md5 digest, so that # output won't match truncated version of secret, or anything # else that's fixed and predictable. spoil_digest = secret + _DUMMY_BYTES # # append user to secret # # Policy appears to be: # # * Nothing appended for enable password (user = "") # # * ASA: If user present, but secret is >= 28 chars, nothing appended. # # * 1-2 byte users not allowed. # DEVIATION: we're letting them through, and repeating their # chars ala 3-char user, to simplify testing. # Could issue warning in the future though. # # * 3 byte user has first char repeated, to pad to 4. # (observed under ASA 9.6, assuming true elsewhere) # # * 4 byte users are used directly. # # * 5+ byte users are truncated to 4 bytes. # user = self.user if user: if isinstance(user, unicode): user = user.encode("utf-8") if not asa or len(secret) < 28: secret += repeat_string(user, 4) # # pad / truncate result to limit # # While PIX always pads to 16 bytes, ASA increases to 32 bytes IFF # secret+user > 16 bytes. This makes PIX & ASA have different results # where secret size in range(13,16), and user is present -- # PIX will truncate to 16, ASA will truncate to 32. # if asa and len(secret) > 16: pad_size = 32 else: pad_size = 16 secret = right_pad_string(secret, pad_size) # # md5 digest # if spoil_digest: # make sure digest won't match truncated version of secret secret += spoil_digest digest = md5(secret).digest() # # drop every 4th byte # NOTE: guessing this was done because it makes output exactly # 16 bytes, which may have been a general 'char password[]' # size limit under PIX # digest = join_byte_elems(c for i, c in enumerate(digest) if (i + 1) & 3) # # encode using Hash64 # return h64.encode_bytes(digest).decode("ascii") # NOTE: works, but needs UTs. # @classmethod # def same_as_pix(cls, secret, user=""): # """ # test whether (secret + user) combination should # have the same hash under PIX and ASA. # # mainly present to help unittests. # """ # # see _calc_checksum() above for details of this logic. # size = len(to_bytes(secret, "utf-8")) # if user and size < 28: # size += 4 # return size < 17 #=================================================================== # eoc #=================================================================== class cisco_asa(cisco_pix): """ This class implements the password hash used by Cisco ASA/PIX 7.0 and newer (2005). Aside from a different internal algorithm, it's use and format is identical to the older :class:`cisco_pix` class. For passwords less than 13 characters, this should be identical to :class:`!cisco_pix`, but will generate a different hash for most larger inputs (See the `Format & Algorithm`_ section for the details). This class only allows passwords <= 32 bytes, anything larger will result in a :exc:`~passlib.exc.PasswordSizeError` if passed to :meth:`~cisco_asa.hash`, and be silently rejected if passed to :meth:`~cisco_asa.verify`. .. versionadded:: 1.7 .. versionchanged:: 1.7.1 Passwords > 32 bytes are now rejected / throw error instead of being silently truncated, to match Cisco behavior. A number of :ref:`bugs <passlib-asa96-bug>` were fixed which caused prior releases to generate unverifiable hashes in certain cases. """ #=================================================================== # class attrs #=================================================================== #-------------------- # PasswordHash #-------------------- name = "cisco_asa" #-------------------- # TruncateMixin #-------------------- truncate_size = 32 #-------------------- # cisco_pix #-------------------- _is_asa = True #=================================================================== # eoc #=================================================================== #============================================================================= # type 7 #============================================================================= class cisco_type7(uh.GenericHandler): """ This class implements the "Type 7" password encoding used by Cisco IOS, and follows the :ref:`password-hash-api`. It has a simple 4-5 bit salt, but is nonetheless a reversible encoding instead of a real hash. The :meth:`~passlib.ifc.PasswordHash.using` method accepts the following optional keywords: :type salt: int :param salt: This may be an optional salt integer drawn from ``range(0,16)``. If omitted, one will be chosen at random. :type relaxed: bool :param relaxed: By default, providing an invalid value for one of the other keywords will result in a :exc:`ValueError`. If ``relaxed=True``, and the error can be corrected, a :exc:`~passlib.exc.PasslibHashWarning` will be issued instead. Correctable errors include ``salt`` values that are out of range. Note that while this class outputs digests in upper-case hexadecimal, it will accept lower-case as well. This class also provides the following additional method: .. automethod:: decode """ #=================================================================== # class attrs #=================================================================== #-------------------- # PasswordHash #-------------------- name = "cisco_type7" setting_kwds = ("salt",) #-------------------- # GenericHandler #-------------------- checksum_chars = uh.UPPER_HEX_CHARS #-------------------- # HasSalt #-------------------- # NOTE: encoding could handle max_salt_value=99, but since key is only 52 # chars in size, not sure what appropriate behavior is for that edge case. min_salt_value = 0 max_salt_value = 52 #=================================================================== # methods #=================================================================== @classmethod def using(cls, salt=None, **kwds): subcls = super(cisco_type7, cls).using(**kwds) if salt is not None: salt = subcls._norm_salt(salt, relaxed=kwds.get("relaxed")) subcls._generate_salt = staticmethod(lambda: salt) return subcls @classmethod def from_string(cls, hash): hash = to_unicode(hash, "ascii", "hash") if len(hash) < 2: raise uh.exc.InvalidHashError(cls) salt = int(hash[:2]) # may throw ValueError return cls(salt=salt, checksum=hash[2:].upper()) def __init__(self, salt=None, **kwds): super(cisco_type7, self).__init__(**kwds) if salt is not None: salt = self._norm_salt(salt) elif self.use_defaults: salt = self._generate_salt() assert self._norm_salt(salt) == salt, "generated invalid salt: %r" % (salt,) else: raise TypeError("no salt specified") self.salt = salt @classmethod def _norm_salt(cls, salt, relaxed=False): """ validate & normalize salt value. .. note:: the salt for this algorithm is an integer 0-52, not a string """ if not isinstance(salt, int): raise uh.exc.ExpectedTypeError(salt, "integer", "salt") if 0 <= salt <= cls.max_salt_value: return salt msg = "salt/offset must be in 0..52 range" if relaxed: warn(msg, uh.PasslibHashWarning) return 0 if salt < 0 else cls.max_salt_value else: raise ValueError(msg) @staticmethod def _generate_salt(): return uh.rng.randint(0, 15) def to_string(self): return "%02d%s" % (self.salt, uascii_to_str(self.checksum)) def _calc_checksum(self, secret): # XXX: no idea what unicode policy is, but all examples are # 7-bit ascii compatible, so using UTF-8 if isinstance(secret, unicode): secret = secret.encode("utf-8") return hexlify(self._cipher(secret, self.salt)).decode("ascii").upper() @classmethod def decode(cls, hash, encoding="utf-8"): """decode hash, returning original password. :arg hash: encoded password :param encoding: optional encoding to use (defaults to ``UTF-8``). :returns: password as unicode """ self = cls.from_string(hash) tmp = unhexlify(self.checksum.encode("ascii")) raw = self._cipher(tmp, self.salt) return raw.decode(encoding) if encoding else raw # type7 uses a xor-based vingere variant, using the following secret key: _key = u("dsfd;kfoA,.iyewrkldJKDHSUBsgvca69834ncxv9873254k;fg87") @classmethod def _cipher(cls, data, salt): """xor static key against data - encrypts & decrypts""" key = cls._key key_size = len(key) return join_byte_values( value ^ ord(key[(salt + idx) % key_size]) for idx, value in enumerate(iter_byte_values(data)) ) #============================================================================= # eof #=============================================================================
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